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How People Understand Risk Matrices, and How Matrix
Design Can Improve their Use: Findings from Randomized
Controlled Studies
Holly Sutherland ,1,2 Gabriel Recchia ,1,∗ Sarah Dryhurst ,1
and Alexandra L.J. Freeman 1
Risk matrices are a common way to communicate the likelihood and potential impacts of a
variety of risks. Until now, there has been little empirical work on their effectiveness in sup-
porting understanding and decision making, and on how different design choices affect these.
In this pair of online experiments (total n = 2699), we show that risk matrices are not always
superior to text for the presentation of risk information, and that a nonlinear/geometric label-
ing scheme helps matrix comprehension (when the likelihood/impact scales are nonlinear). To
a lesser degree, results suggested that changing the shape of the matrix so that cells increase
in size nonlinearly facilitates comprehension as compared to text alone, and that comprehen-
sion might be enhanced by integrating further details about the likelihood and impact onto
the axes of the matrix rather than putting them in a separate key. These changes did not affect
participants’ preference for reducing impact over reducing likelihood when making decisions
about risk mitigation. We recommend that designers of risk matrices consider these changes
to facilitate better understanding of relationships among risks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In order to prioritize resources and make deci-
sions when mitigating or preparing for hazards, risk
managers and responders need to understand those
hazards’ likelihoods and potential impacts. A com-
mon way to represent these is via a risk matrix:
a table or graph illustrating likelihood on one axis
and potential impact on the other. Hazards are then
1Winton Centre for Risk and Evidence Communication, Depart-
ment of Pure Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics, Univer-
sity of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
2Salvesen Mindroom Research Centre, University of Edinburgh,
Edinburgh, UK.
∗Address correspondence to Gabriel Recchia, Winton Centre for
Risk and Evidence Communication, Centre for Mathematical
Sciences, Wilberforce Road, Cambridge, CB3 0WA, UK; tel:
+44(0)1223.764.247; glr29@cam.ac.uk
graphically represented by being located in the ap-
propriate section of the matrix space. This allows an
“at a glance” assessment of the risk a given hazard
poses and of the potential effects of mitigation mea-
sures, and a comparison between it and other hazards
in the matrix.
In addition to facilitating decision making by risk
managers, such matrices are also used to commu-
nicate information to policymakers and sometimes
the broader public. For example, the U.K. National
Risk Register, an accounting of malicious and non-
malicious risks facing the United Kingdom and
their estimated likelihood and impact, helps guide
government decision making. The public version of
this register includes a risk matrix, and information
is presented to policymakers and stakeholders in
a similar format (The U.K. Cabinet Office, 2017).
There are also other contexts where risk matrices
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are used for decision making by individuals who are
not necessarily frequent or sophisticated users of
the format, such as when regulatory or compliance
guidelines mandate their use for risk assessment or
mitigation plans that occur on a relatively infrequent
basis. In some such cases, they are being used by
individuals who use such matrices rarely, and for
whom risk assessment or mitigation may only be a
small and occasional part of their job. It is therefore
crucial to ensure that risk matrices are clear and
comprehensible for nonexpert users.
Risk matrices find widespread use in many crit-
ical contexts, such as national risk registers, reports
by national and international organizations, interna-
tional safety standards, and military risk assessments
(see Dillon, Liebe, & Bestafka, 2009; Kerckhoffs,
2017; The U.K. Cabinet Office, 2017; United State
Department of Defense, 1993; World Economic Fo-
rum, 2021 and many of the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization standards for examples). In
some cases, both of the matrix’s axes may be numeri-
cally specified and the risks well-quantified (quantita-
tive risk matrices), but equally matrices may be used
to communicate much more qualitative assessments
of risk, with either one or both axes being categori-
cal (semiqualitative and qualitative risk matrices). In
almost all cases, however, the axes represent nonlin-
ear scales. In this project we took as an exemplar the
U.K.’s National Risk Register where, as in many or-
ganizations, the risks are semi-qualitative: likelihoods
of reasonable worst-case scenarios are expressed in
one of five categories, as are their corresponding im-
pacts. Likelihood categories are pinned to probabilis-
tic ranges, for example, “25 to 125 in 500,” while the
impact scale is ordinal. In addition, the likelihood
categories represent logarithmically increasing prob-
abilities, with each category representing a likelihood
range five times greater than the previous.
There are extensive theoretical critiques of risk
matrices (Cox, Babayev, & Huber, 2005; Cox, 2008;
Duijm, 2015; Monat & Doremus, 2018), most of
which are aimed at mathematical or logical issues
with quantitative risk matrices; there appears to be
little literature considering the merits and demerits
of qualitative and semiqualitative matrices. There is
some qualitative experimental evidence that people
may struggle to use semiqualitative risk matrices to
make rational decisions (Monat & Doremus, 2018),
but there is otherwise also an absence of experimen-
tal studies on people’s perception, use, and compre-
hension of risk matrices. While in many cases risk ma-
trices are used as a prompt during the risk assessment
process to help risk managers think through the po-
tential outcomes of different events and the potential
mitigations they might put in place, in other cases risk
matrices are used specifically to attempt to communi-
cate a risk manager’s assessment to another individ-
ual, to allow the latter to consider the hazards and
weigh up potential mitigation activities.
1.1. Room for Improvement?
The use of logarithmically increasing categories
in risk matrices is very common and is sometimes
explicitly recommended (Wijnia, 2012). Logarithmic
scales facilitate comparison between risks that span
several orders of magnitude, and can aid interpre-
tation of data with logarithmic/exponential trends
(Field, 1917). However, research suggests that even
expert audiences have difficulties with logarithmic
scales. For example, in a survey sent to the United
States’ largest organization of professional ecolo-
gists, far fewer respondents correctly interpreted
graphs with log-log scales than graphs with linear
scales (56% versus 93%, respectively, Menge et al.,
2018). Significant difficulties in understanding plots
with logarithmic axes have also been demonstrated
among third and fourth-year engineering undergrad-
uates (Heckler, Mikula, & Rosenblatt, 2013) and the
general public (Romano, Sotis, Dominioni, & Guidi,
2020).
If audiences do not comprehend the nonlinear
nature of risk matrix axes, this may considerably
compromise their ability to make decisions that in-
volve comparing risks posed by different hazards (or
a hazard before and after mitigation), the very de-
cisions that risk matrices are designed to assist with.
Whether there are changes to risk matrices that make
such misinterpretations less likely has never been for-
mally tested. We identified three characteristics of
risk matrices, particularly salient in the U.K.’s Na-
tional Risk Register, that could plausibly affect the
degree to which audiences successfully understand
the nonlinear scale and manage to keep it in mind
while using the matrix: scale labeling, cell shape, and
key placement.
1.1.1. Scale Labeling
Some matrix designs, such as the U.K.’s 2017 Na-
tional Risk Register (The U.K. Cabinet Office, 2017)
and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control influenza
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risk register (Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, 2020), use linear labeling on the axes (e.g., 1,
2, 3, etc.) even though the likelihoods or impacts rep-
resented by these labels increase at a nonlinear rate.
In light of their findings on expert misunderstand-
ing of log scales, Menge et al. recommended using
untransformed values as scale labels (Menge et al.,
2018). However, the probabilities in risk matrices are
sometimes so small that completely untransformed
values may be difficult to interpret; Heckler et al.
(Heckler et al., 2013) reported that negative expo-
nents (e.g., 10−4) on log scales posed particular chal-
lenges for understanding. One possible alternative is
presenting more familiar numbers that increase at a
nonlinear rate. For example, in a matrix that repre-
sents five different levels of likelihood, with each be-
ing five times more likely than the previous, labeling
the bins with a “geometric” scale of geometrically in-
creasing values 1, 5, 25, 125, and 625 might commu-
nicate the relationships between the different levels
more clearly than values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
1.1.2. Cell Shape
In addition to modified scale labeling, adding log
tick marks with variable spacing has been shown to
help students understand plots with logarithmic axes
(Heckler et al., 2013), but this only makes sense for
axes that represent continuous values. It may be pos-
sible to achieve a similar effect for categorical ma-
trices by modifying the spacing of the lines that di-
vide rows and columns, such that cells to the top-right
of the matrix are larger than those to the bottom-
left. Increasing the size of cells as one moves to the
top right of such a matrix—a “logarithmic” format—
could have a positive influence on users by providing
a visual cue that works with both magnitude prim-
ing effects (where the visual size of something can
prime a scale-independent sense of magnitude, Op-
penheimer, LeBoeuf, & Brewer, 2008) and size con-
gruity effects (where incongruencies between physi-
cal size and numerical value are thought to produce
cognitive interference, e.g. Tzelgov, Meyer, & Henik,
1992). In addition, the visual cue may simply serve
as a salient reminder that differences between val-
ues become larger as one moves further to the top-
right. For example, in a hypothetical matrix where
the columns correspond to likelihoods of 0.001%,
0.01%, 0.1%, 1%, and 10%, the difference between
columns 1 and 2 is numerically smaller than the dif-
ference between columns 4 and 5, a fact which this
approach would also represent graphically.1 A review
of the graph comprehension literature similarly cites
ample evidence that “when a visual feature does not
automatically evoke a particular fact or relationship,
then that information is more difficult to comprehend
and viewers may make an error in interpretation”
(Shah & Hoeffner, 2002, p. 50), further suggesting
that this approach may yield comprehension benefits.
1.1.3. Key Placement
Risk matrices differ in terms of whether informa-
tion about the meaning of each column and row—the
“key” — is integrated directly into the matrix axes
or represented separately, in a legend or surrounding
text. As legends require the diagram user to refer-
ence information away from the diagram itself, the
user must keep either the legend (while looking at
the diagram) or the diagram (while looking at the
legend) in working memory, increasing the cognitive
demand of understanding the information provided
or of using the diagram (Shah & Hoeffner, 2002).
If participants cannot keep the information in work-
ing memory, or if they are using the diagram for an
extended period of time, they may need to look re-
peatedly back and forth between the diagram and
the legend (Fausset, Rogers, & Fisk, 2008). As such,
design guidelines for diagrams or other kinds of vi-
sual information generally recommend that as much
information be integrated into the diagram as possi-
ble, for ease of use (Carpenter & Shah, 1998). This
frees up the user’s working memory—and other as-
sociated executive functioning/cognitive resources—
to be used exclusively on deciphering the diagram
itself and comprehending/manipulating the informa-
tion contained therein. However, directly labeling
each row and column can also contribute to visual
clutter (Shah & Hoeffner, 2002), which may impose
its own demands on working memory.
1.2. Do Risk Matrix Features Affect Users’
Prioritizations of Likelihood Versus Impact?
Modifications to risk matrices could theoreti-
cally also influence perception and prioritization of
the two dimensions represented (impact and likeli-
hood). This view is shared by Woodruff (Woodruff,
2005), who, in a critique of a perceived institutional
1For example, the physical distance between the centers (or left
edges) of cells 1 and 2 would be smaller than the distance between
the centers (or left edges) of cells 4 and 5.
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overemphasis on impact over likelihood, argued for
the use of a matrix that overlays information about
whether risks should be considered acceptable, tol-
erable, or unacceptable. However, one aspect of the
specific matrix Woodruff proposed might uninten-
tionally make impact more salient. Specifically, the
longest side of Woodruff’s proposed matrix is against
the axis that was used to represent impact. The phys-
ical distance between high-impact and low-impact
cells thus tends to be larger than the distance be-
tween high-likelihood and low-likelihood cells. Dif-
ferences in impact might therefore appear “larger”
than differences in likelihood in this matrix, which
could theoretically make users more apt to prioritize
impact than they would have been if the longest side
had been placed against the axis used to represent
likelihood,2 for example, due to magnitude priming.
1.3. Hypotheses
Owing to the considerations in Section 1.1, we
hypothesized there would be a difference with re-
spect to participants’ performance on a set of ques-
tions we devised that required them to compare mul-
tiple risks and to understand the nonlinear nature of
the matrix’s axes. Specifically, we expected better per-
formance in conditions that emphasized the nonlin-
ear nature of the values represented on the matrix’s
axes. These conditions were the “logarithmic” format
(section 1.1.2), tested in Experiments 1 and 2, and the
“geometric” scale (Section 1.1.1), tested in Experi-
ment 2 only.
We also predicted that there would be a differ-
ence between conditions in participants’ prioritiza-
tion of impact versus likelihood reduction. Specifi-
cally, we hypothesized that any tendency to reduce
impact over likelihood or vice versa would be mini-
mized in conditions with square cells. This hypothesis
was tested in Experiment 1.
Both experiments were preregistered, and mea-
sures were informed by a pilot study and on qualita-
tive interviews with professional risk managers who
use risk matrices during their work. The preregistra-
tion for Experiment 1 can be found at https://osf.io/
h2s4g with a postpilot amendment at https://osf.io/
qf8mg. The preregistration for Experiment 2 can be
found at https://osf.io/c93mf. Ethical oversight was
2Standards differ by industry with respect to whether likelihood or
impact is represented on the y-axis. Generally, the longest side of
the matrix is whichever side is against the y-axis, though there is
no real reason that this need be the case.
given by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee
at the University of Cambridge (PRE.2019.023).
2. EXPERIMENT 1
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Design and Stimuli
The aim of this experiment was to assess whether
changes to the form of the matrix and its cells af-
fected participants’ basic knowledge (of the likeli-
hoods and impacts of different risks) and use of the
information in risk comparisons (e.g., being able to
compare effects of risk-mitigation actions). Partici-
pants were randomized to one of four conditions: a
standard risk matrix, with rectangular cells (Fig. 1);
a risk matrix with square cells (Fig. 2); a “logarith-
mic” risk matrix designed by the authors, where the
width and height of the cells increased as the values
on the axes increased (Fig. 3); or the control condi-
tion, a short paragraph of text (Fig. 4).
Participants were informed that the risks in ques-
tion related to hypothetical flood risks, and specific
risks labeled with each stimulus were described sim-
ply to participants as “risk A” and “risk B”. These
abstract terms were intentionally selected so as to
avoid potential confounds that any particular choice
of concrete flood risks might have elicited. In all
cases, risks A and B were assigned to different cells,
with each corresponding to a different combination
of likelihood and impact. The specific cells in which
risks A and B were placed differed for each type of
question block; details are provided in Section 2.1.3.
There were five possible likelihood categories (less
than 0.2% / less than 1 in 500; 0.2−1% / 1–5 in 500;
1−5% / 5–25 in 500; 5−25% / 25–125 in 500; greater
than 25% / greater than 125 in 500), corresponding to
the likelihood ranges used by the U.K. National Risk
Register. In addition, there were five possible impact
categories. While the U.K. National Risk Register
does not make use of descriptive terms for categoriz-
ing impact, we wished to ensure that the increasing
level of impact was clear to our lay participants, and
therefore employed corresponding category labels in
use elsewhere in U.K. government: “limited,” “mi-
nor,” “moderate,” “significant,” and “catastrophic”
(Fire and Rescue Service, 2020). Stimuli were kept
consistent between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
with the exception of the differences highlighted in
the description of Experiment 2. Original stimuli are
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Fig 1. Example of stimulus shown in
the standard risk matrix condition
Fig 2. Example of stimulus shown in
the square risk matrix condition
available in the OSF repository at https://osf.io/es72a/
?view_only=7aeef3eceaa743059f64b414eea76159.
2.1.2. Participants
Participants were recruited via the ISO-
accredited market research company Respondi
to an online survey presented in Qualtrics. Quotas
were used to ensure participants were representative
of the U.K. population by sex and age, according to
the U.K. census (Office for National Statistics, 2016).
Participants were excluded for noncompletion. No
outlier participants or data points were excluded. A
pilot study (n = 142) was used to test the procedure
and stimuli (results unreported). The questionnaire
was completed in a median time of 23.5 minutes; par-
ticipants were paid £1.40. Demographic information
is reported in Supporting Information Table F1.
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Fig 3. Example of stimulus shown in
the “logarithmic” risk matrix condition
Fig 4. Example of stimulus shown in the
text control condition
To determine the number of participants to
recruit, we performed power calculations using
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009),
aiming for 90% power to detect a small effect size
of f = 0.1 (Cohen’s d = 0.2), with an alpha of 0.05.
These analyses suggested it would be necessary to
recruit n = 1,422 participants. Type I error rate was
controlled by selecting a small number of hypothe-
ses, rather than by alpha adjustment. Due to quota-
related rounding, 1,426 participants completed the
study and were included in the analysis.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants’ prior experiences and beliefs about
flooding, and their experiences with risk matrices,
were collected via a series of questions within the
survey before they saw any stimuli. They were then
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given an example matrix (or text control) with in-
structions on how to read and interpret the condition
that they were randomized to (see Appendix A), and
were asked to rate how easy they found it to under-
stand, and how useful they thought it would be for
making decisions about flood risks, on seven-point
Likert scales. Each participant was then shown ba-
sic knowledge, risk comparison, and likelihood ver-
sus impact reduction question blocks, as follows:
2.1.3.1. Basic knowledge. Basic knowledge
questions were intended to measure participants’ ba-
sic comprehension of the information (e.g., their abil-
ity to identify correctly the likelihood and impact of
a particular risk; their ability to identify which of two
risks was more likely or more impactful and by how
much). Examples include “What is the likelihood of
risk A?,” “Which risk has the greater impact: risk A,
or risk B?,” and “Which position on the grid above
represents the greatest possible risk?” See Support-
ing Information Fig. G1 for the full list. The values of
risks A and B were randomly sampled from the five
likelihood and impact categories, and then checked
by the researchers to ensure that a broad range of
impact and likelihood combinations occurred within
each question block. A ceiling effect was expected on
these questions, given their relatively basic nature.
The number of correctly answered questions in this
block was summed for each participant to create a
single ‘basic knowledge score’ out of eight.
2.1.3.2. Risk comparison. A set of more chal-
lenging comprehension questions was devised, each
of which required participants to engage in a risk
comparison: that is, to compare multiple risks in a
manner that required participants to understand the
nonlinear nature of the matrix’s axes. Examples in-
clude “Which risk has had its likelihood decreased
the most?,” “Which risk has had its potential im-
pact decreased the most?,” and “Do you decrease
the likelihood of risk A or risk B?,” presented af-
ter vignettes about local government efforts to re-
duce flood risks. See Supporting Information Fig. G2
for the full list and corresponding vignettes. The re-
searchers hand-selected the position of risks A and
B, as there were a limited number of positions on
the matrix where A and B could be placed such that
the questions would have answers that could be ob-
jectively judged as correct or incorrect. There were
18 questions in total and the number of correctly an-
swered questions was summed for each participant to
create a single “risk comparison score” out of 18.
2.1.3.3. Likelihood versus impact reduction
questions. Participants had three opportunities to
indicate whether they would prefer to reduce impact
or likelihood when a risk was placed such that partic-
ipants could either reduce its impact (i.e., move it one
cell to the left) or its likelihood (i.e., move it one cell
down). The question used in all cases was: “A city in
the UK is at risk of flooding, shown above as risk A.
The local government has some money it can use to
decrease either the likelihood or impact of risk A, by
the amount shown. Both options cost the same, and
the local government can only afford to choose one.
Do you think the local government should choose to
decrease the likelihood or the impact of risk A?” Par-
ticipants were asked the question for risks appear-
ing at <likelihood category, impact category> coor-
dinates of <2, 4>, <4, 2>, and <4, 4>. Preferences
for prioritizing likelihood were scored as −1, prefer-
ences for prioritizing impact were scored as 1, and
response values were averaged for each participant
to provide a “prioritization score.” A score closer to
−1 indicated a preference toward prioritizing the re-
duction of likelihood; a score closer to 1 indicated a
preference toward decreasing impact.
The order of question sets3 was randomized
within each block, and the order of questions within
each question set was also randomized. After com-
pleting the above tasks, participants again rated the
risk presentation format they had been randomized
to on how easy it was to understand, how useful they
thought it would be for making decisions about flood
risks, how confident they would feel using it to make
decisions about flood risks, and how confident they
would feel using it to explain flood risks to others, on
seven-point Likert scales.
In the final section, participants completed a
“matrix preference task” in which they were pre-
sented with the four conditions on a single page, and
asked to select which risk presentation format they
would prefer to use for making decisions about risks.
Finally, they completed two questionnaires:
2.1.3.4. Numeracy. Participants completed
the adaptive Berlin numeracy test (Cokely, Galesic,
3For example, “What is the likelihood/impact of A?” is a question
set, made up of multiple questions with different stimuli. See Sup-
porting Information Figs. G1–G2.
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Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012) and
the Schwartz numeracy scale (Schwartz, Woloshin,
Black, & Welch, 1997). Combining the Berlin numer-
acy test with “at least one other test” of numeracy
is recommended for general population samples
to reduce skew and provide better discrimination
between low-numeracy participants (Cokely et al.,
2012), and subsequent work has demonstrated that
the Schwartz is a good choice (Cokely, Ghazal,
Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & Schulz, 2013; Cokely,
Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2014). We also in-
cluded a single item from the expanded numeracy
scale Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer (2001): “Which of the
following numbers represents the biggest risk? 1 in
100, 1 in 1000, or 1 in 10?”), which has been used
alone as a basic measure of objective numeracy (e.g.,
Nelson, Moser, & Han, 2013). The Berlin numeracy
test score was summed with the total number of
correct answers on the additional questions to give
each participant a “total numeracy score” out of
eight.
2.1.3.5. Demographics. In order to assess how
representative our survey pool was of the U.K. pop-
ulation, participants were asked their gender, age,
race/ethnicity, highest completed education, annual
household income for the previous year, and politi-
cal views from left- to right-wing using a seven-point
scale.
2.1.4. Pilot study
A preregistered pilot study (n = 142) was run
prior to Experiment 1 to test the measures, and to
ensure normality of data for key measures where a
ceiling effect was not expected (i.e., the risk compar-
ison score and the prioritization score). A postpilot
amendment noting changes made in the light of the
results was registered at https://osf.io/qf8mg. Devia-
tions from preregistrations appear in Appendix B.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Hypothesis 1—Risk Comparison Score
Because of significant violations of homogeneity
of variance, a partial proportional odds ratio model
was fitted to determine the effect of format on risk
comparison scores, controlling for numeracy by treat-
ing participants’ total numeracy score as a covariate.
The text condition was treated as the control (refer-
ence group).
Risk comparison scores were higher for partic-
ipants who had viewed the logarithmic matrix as
opposed to the text control (est. = 0.26 (95% CI
= 0.01−0.51), p = 0.038), confirming Hypothesis 1.
There was no significant difference between scores
of those who viewed the standard matrix versus the
text control (est. = 0.09 (95% CI = −0.14−0.36), p =
0.484) or between the square matrix and the text con-
trol (est. = 0.01 (95% CI = −0.23−0.25), p = 0.935).
See Table I for means and standard deviations. Nu-
meracy was a significant covariate.
2.2.2. Hypothesis 2—Likelihood Versus Impact
A one-sample t-test, with a reference value of 0,
revealed a mean prioritization score of 0.09 (95% CI:
0.06 – 0.12), showing that participants indeed demon-
strated prioritization toward reducing impact over
likelihood, t(1426) = 6.25, p < 0.0001. An ANCOVA
was conducted to determine an effect of format, con-
trolling for numeracy. The ANCOVA showed no
main effect of format (F3,1421 = 0.88, p = 0.452). Nu-
meracy was not a significant covariate.
2.2.3. Other Analyses
Apart from our two main, preregistered hy-
potheses, we also explored whether participants’
comprehension was affected by the amount of pre-
vious experience they had with risk matrices. We fur-
ther considered their subjective preferences between
the formats, and explored interactions between for-
mat and numeracy. These analyses are reported in
Appendix C.
Given the (expected) ceiling effect seen across
all conditions on basic knowledge questions, basic
knowledge and risk comparison scores for each par-
ticipant were summed to an overall performance
score (out of 26). This was to produce a more normal
distribution, and also because both measures were
essentially testing how well people understood and
could use the condition they had been assigned. As
serious violations of homogeneity of variance per-
sisted, a partial proportional odds ratio model was
again fitted to determine the effect of format on over-
all score, controlling for numeracy and using the text
condition as the reference group. The logarithmic
matrix again performed significantly better than the
text control (est. = 0.30, 95% CI = 0.05−0.35, p =
0.021); means and standard deviations appear in Ta-
ble I. There was no significant difference between
the standard matrix and the text control (p = 0.356),
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Table I. Means and Standard Deviations of Risk Comparison Scores (out of 18), Basic Knowledge Scores (out of 8), and of Overall Score










Risk Comparison Score /18 7.60 (3.19) 7.20 (3.10) 7.75 (3.14) 7.21 (3.82)
Basic Knowledge Score /8 6.80 (1.86) 6.71 (1.84) 6.82 (1.81) 6.48 (2.06)
Overall Score /26 14.40 (4.22) 13.91 (4.27) 14.57 (4.15) 13.69 (5.05)
or between the square matrix and the text control
(p = 0.513).
2.3. Discussion
We had hypothesized that the “logarithmic” de-
sign of matrix would help emphasize the nonlinear
nature of the matrix axes, and hence, compared to
a text-only control, would improve participants’ per-
formance on the risk comparison questions, which
required them to understand the magnitude of the
differences between risks in different cells. Our re-
sults suggested that this was indeed the case. How-
ever, this effect was small, and the other forms of risk
matrix did not significantly improve participants’ per-
formance over the text-only control condition. This
may be because the information presented was rel-
atively simple, with only one or two risks illustrated
per matrix. It is possible that the logarithmic design
improved performance because it provided a subtle
reminder of the nonlinearity—the presumed mecha-
nism behind the improvements Heckler et al. (2013)
found by using log tick marks—but did not actually
induce magnitude priming effects. There was no ef-
fect of format for participants who already had ex-
perience with risk matrices, although there were few
enough such participants that our study may have
been underpowered to detect effects in this subset.
3. EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we aimed to replicate the find-
ing from Experiment 1 of better risk comparison
scores in participants viewing the logarithmic design
than in the text control. Additionally, we aimed to in-
vestigate the effects of how the nonlinear scale was
represented on the axis labels (with label values that
increased linearly: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 versus geometrically:
1, 5, 25, 125, 625; Section 1.1.1) and of using a legend
versus integrating this information directly into the
axes, as described in Section 1.1.3. As in Experiment
1, we hypothesized that conditions which emphasized
the nonlinear nature of the underlying scale would
facilitate risk comparisons. This meant that while we
again expected improvements for participants view-
ing the logarithmic design (vs. the standard design
or text only), we also expected improvements for
participants viewing geometrically increasing (rather
than linearly increasing) scale labels. We further ex-
pected that integrating the information about the
meaning of each row and column from the keys onto
the axes, rather than in a separate legend, would
make it more salient and would similarly improve
performance.
One drawback of the matrix stimuli used in Ex-
periment 1 was the use of the so-called “1-in-X” for-
mat, for example, expressing a risk of 0.2% to 1%
as “1 in 500 to 1 in 100.” Although often historically
used in natural hazard communication (such as “re-
turn periods” for floods and storms), this format has
long been known to create confusion, as more people
misinterpret which of two risks is higher when they
are presented in this format, as opposed to a format
where the denominators are kept the same (Grimes
& Snively, 1999). This may have had a negative im-
pact on comprehension. The 1-in-X representations
were therefore revised in Experiment 2 to a “fre-
quency format” with all denominators fixed at 500,
the lowest common denominator in this case.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Design and Stimuli
Participants were randomized to one of 12 con-
ditions in a 3×2×2 (format × scale labeling × key)
factorial design, with the factors defined as follows:
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Fig 5. An example of the legend key
condition, combined with the standard
risk matrix format and linear scale la-
beling
3.1.1.1. Format. The formats tested were the
standard risk matrix, “logarithmic” risk matrix, and
text control formats used in Experiment 1.
3.1.1.2. Scale labeling. Two approaches to la-
beling the axes were tested, linear and geometric. Par-
ticipants in the linear condition were shown cells la-
beled from 1 through 5. Participants in the geometric
condition were shown cells labeled with the numbers
1, 5, 25, 125, and 625, numerically representing the
five-fold scaling of magnitude. Participants in both
conditions were informed that each level of the scale
represented a magnitude five times greater than the
previous level.
3.1.1.3. Key. We tested two approaches to
representing the key. In the legend condition (Fig. 5),
two legends were placed to the left of and be-
low the matrix/text, providing additional interpre-
tive information about impact and likelihood val-
ues respectively. The integrated condition (Fig. 6) in-
cluded additional interpretive information about im-
pact and likelihood values integrated into the matrix
axes/body of the text to represent a practical alter-
native which might give more information to the au-
dience to help them interpret the nonlinear nature
of the scales and affect their perception and decision
making. In both designs of key, the information given
was the same: numerical and frequency ranges for
each level of the likelihood axis (less than 0.2% or
less than 1 in 500; 0.2−1% 1–5 or in 500; 1−5% or
5–25 in 500; 5−25% or 25–125 in 500; greater than
25% or greater than 125 in 500), and a verbal de-
scription for each level of the impact axis (“limited,”
“minor,” “moderate,” “significant,” “catastrophic”).
To see what stimuli looked like for every combina-
tion of format, scale labeling, and key, please see
Appendix D.
3.1.2. Participants
Participants were recruited as described in Ex-
periment 1. The same exclusion criterion was used;
additionally, participants who took part in Experi-
ment 1 were barred from participating in Experiment
2. Power calculations conducted in the manner previ-
ously described suggested it would be necessary to
recruit n = 1,269 participants. Due to quota-related
rounding, 1,273 participants completed the study and
were included in the analysis. Demographic informa-
tion is reported in Supporting Information Table F1.
Experiment 2 was completed in a median time of 22.4
minutes; participants were paid £2.20.
3.1.3. Procedure
The procedure was as in Experiment 1, with
two differences. First, a questionnaire coding error
meant that two basic knowledge questions (“Which
… represents the greatest/smallest risk?”) were not
displayed correctly to most participants. Therefore,
these two questions were excluded for all participants
from all analyses for Experiment 2, leaving six basic
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Fig 6. An example of the integrated key
condition, combined with the standard
risk matrix format and linear scale label-
ing
Table II. Experiment 2; Means and Standard Deviations of Risk Comparison Scores (out of 18) by Condition
Format
Scale Key Standard Matrix Logarithmic Matrix Text
1-5 Legend 7.60 (3.54) 7.40 (3.23) 7.23 (3.66)
Integrated 7.84 (3.50) 8.36 (3.34) 7.09 (4.11)
1-625 Legend 10.32 (4.70) 10.10 (4.31) 10.91 (3.90)
Integrated 10.86 (4.41) 11.05 (4.17) 9.19 (4.25)
Overall 9.11 (4.29) 9.28 (4.05) 8.57 (4.26)
knowledge questions overall. Second, in the matrix
preference task, participants were asked to choose
between the following in three separate questions: a
standard matrix, a “logarithmic” matrix, and a short
paragraph of text, using the same scale labeling and
key conditions they had seen; linear and geometric
scale labels using the same format and key condi-
tions they had seen; and a separate legend versus in-
tegrated information using the same format and scale
labels they had seen.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Risk Comparison Scores
A three-way ANCOVA was conducted to deter-
mine the effect of format, scale labeling, and key on
risk comparison scores, controlling for numeracy. The
results confirmed our hypotheses about the effect of
the logarithmic format and the geometric scale la-
bels, although we did not observe an effect for the
integrated versus legend conditions. Specifically, we
observed a main effect of format (F2,1260 = 4.95,
p = 0.007), f = 0.09 (90% CI: 0.04 – 0.13); see the fi-
nal row of Table II. However, Tukey’s post hoc tests,
which adjust for multiple comparisons, revealed no
statistically significant contrasts.
There was also a main effect of scale labeling
(F1,1260 = 210.54, p < 0.0001), with participants who
viewed the geometric (1–625) scale labels perform-
ing better than those viewing the linear (1–5) scale
labels, M(SD) 10.39 (4.33) versus 7.61 (3.57) respec-
tively. The effect size of scale labeling on risk compar-
ison score was f = 0.41 (90% CI: 0.36 – 0.46). There
was no main effect of key (F1,1260 = 0.79, p = 0.375).
Means and standard deviations for every combina-
tion of conditions are reported in Table II; see also
Fig. 7.
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Fig 7. Graph showing the mean risk
comparison score per condition, with
bootstrapped 95% confidence inter-
vals. Conditions are labeled by format
(“Stand.” = standard matrix, “Log.” =
logarithmic matrix), scale label, and key
(“Leg.” = legends used, “Integ.” = inte-
grated information)
Table III. Experiment 2; Means and Standard Deviations of Risk Comparison Scores (out of 18), Aggregating over Scale Labeling
Format
Key Standard Matrix Logarithmic Matrix Text
Legend 9.02 (4.39) 8.85 (4.07) 8.92 (4.19)
Integrated 9.20 (4.21) 9.68 (3.99) 8.21 (4.30)
There was additionally an interaction effect of
format × key (F2,1260 = 10.42, p < 0.0001), f = 0.13
(90% CI = 0.8−0.17). Descriptively, risk comparison
scores were higher with the integrated information
(vs. legend) for the standard matrix and logarithmic
matrix, but lower for the text (Table III).
Due to concerns that the differences in risk com-
parison score between the geometric and linear con-
ditions could be primarily driven by a single set of
questions within the comparison block (“How many
times more likely is risk A than risk B?”; for the
linear condition this requires the participant to per-
form calculations, for the geometric condition this
can be read off the axis), the ANCOVA was rerun
with those questions excluded from the risk com-
parison score. The main effect of scale labeling was
still highly significant (F1,1260 = 146.47, p < 0.0001),
f = 0.34 (90% CI: 0.29 – 0.39). Format, numeracy, and
format × key interactions also remained significant
at the level of p < 0.01. This suggests that improve-
ments in risk comparison score with the geometric
scale labels were not solely due to improvements on
this single set of questions.
3.2.2. Related Preregistered Analyses: Basic
Knowledge Scores and Overall Scores
Because of ceiling effects on the basic knowl-
edge questions, basic knowledge and risk comparison
scores for each participant were summed to form an
overall performance score (out of 24), to produce a
more normal distribution. Overall performance score
means and standard deviations for every combina-
tion of conditions are reported in Table IV.
A three-way ANCOVA for overall performance
score, controlling for numeracy, showed a main ef-
fect of format (F2,1260 = 13.32, p < 0.0001, f = 0.15
(90% CI = 0.10−0.19)). A Tukey’s post hoc revealed
that participants viewing the standard and logarith-
mic matrices performed better than those viewing the
text condition (p = 0.03 and p = 0.003, respectively),
though there was no significant difference between
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Table IV. Experiment 2; Means and Standard Deviations of Overall Performance Scores (out of 24) by Condition
Format
Scale Key Standard Matrix Logarithmic Matrix Text
1-5 Legend 12.48 (4.41) 12.47 (4.02) 11.63 (4.80)
Integrated 12.77 (4.30) 13.50 (3.98) 11.46 (5.08)
1-625 Legend 15.11 (5.75) 14.92 (5.47) 15.49 (5.10)
Integrated 15.74 (5.40) 15.96 (5.02) 13.17 (5.46)
Overall 13.99 (5.16) 14.26 (4.85) 12.90 (5.34)
Table V. Experiment 2; Means and Standard Deviations of Overall Performance Scores (out of 24), Aggregating over Scale Labeling
Format
Key Standard Matrix Logarithmic Matrix Text
Legend 13.85 (5.31) 13.79 (4.99) 13.41 (5.29)
Integrated 14.12 (5.04) 14.71 (4.68) 12.37 (5.34)
the logarithmic and standard matrices (p = 0.73); see
the final row of Table IV. There was also a main ef-
fect of scale labeling (F1,1260 = 134.83, p < 0.0001, f =
0.33 (90% CI = 0.28−0.37)), with participants who
viewed the geometric scale labels performing bet-
ter than those viewing the linear scale labels; means
(standard deviations) were 15.06 (5.43) versus 12.42
(4.47), respectively. There was no main effect of key
(F1,1260 = 0.30, p = 0.586).
There was additionally an interaction effect of
format × key (F2,1260 = 11.61, p < 0.0001, f = 0.14
(90% CI = 0.9−0.18)). Means in each condition
(Table V) exhibited the same descriptive pattern as
observed for risk comparison scores (Table III).
We did not consider an ANCOVA appropriate
for primary analysis of basic knowledge scores due to
their severe nonnormality, but we did consider it rea-
sonable as a follow-up confirmatory analysis to the
analysis reported above, given that ANCOVAs are
considered fairly robust to normality violation (Ole-
jnik & Algina, 1984), and given that an ANCOVA for
basic knowledge (“comprehension”) scores had been
preregistered. This analysis is reported in Appendix
E section 1.
3.2.3. Other Analyses
As in Experiment 1, we explored whether the
different formats affected participants’ overall com-
prehension and whether this was affected by the
amount of previous experience they had with risk
matrices. We also considered their subjective pref-
erences between the formats, looked for interac-
tions between format and numeracy, and investigated
whether the tendency to select likelihood/impact re-
duction varied with format. These analyses are re-
ported in Appendix E sections 2 & 3.
3.3. Discussion
As hypothesized, the geometric scale labeling (1,
5, 25, 125, 625) substantially improved participants’
ability to answer risk comparison questions, produc-
ing the largest effect size observed in this set of exper-
iments (f = 0.41). These risk comparison questions
required not only understanding of which of two
risks was larger, but also the accurate characteriza-
tion of relative differences in the likelihood and im-
pact between risks, and the use of impact and likeli-
hood information simultaneously to make decisions.
A plausible explanation for this improvement is that
it made the nonlinear nature of the underlying scales
clearer to participants by explicitly showing the five-
fold increase in magnitude between adjacent rows or
columns—as opposed to the linear labeling (1, 2, 3,
4, 5), where participants had to remember that the
underlying scale increased nonlinearly.
As in Experiment 1, in addition to the primary
risk comparison measure, a “basic knowledge score”
corresponding to the easier measure of comprehen-
sion was investigated (reported in Appendix E). One
unexpected finding was that participants viewing the
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geometric scale labeling had lower basic knowledge
scores than those viewing the linear scale labeling,
although this effect was very weak (f = 0.06). Given
that the distribution of basic knowledge scores vio-
lated ANCOVA assumptions, it is possible that this
finding was merely a statistical artefact, although this
difference was also found by a nonparametric sta-
tistical test. A possible explanation for this discrep-
ancy is that the 1–5 linear scale was more familiar and
therefore easier to read, which is relevant given that
the basic knowledge questions simply required read-
ing numbers off the diagram. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by the fact that the questions driving the dif-
ference in basic knowledge scores were of the form,
“What is the impact/likelihood of risk A?”. The ba-
sic knowledge questions also came before the risk
comparison questions, before participants had much
practice using the unfamiliar matrix, and may have
been differentially affected by its unfamiliarity for
this reason.
In any event, participants in the geometric la-
beling condition performed significantly better on
the risk comparison questions, as well as on basic
knowledge and risk comparison questions when they
were aggregated into a single index (“overall perfor-
mance”). This was true even when the questions that
asked how many times larger one risk was than an-
other were removed, suggesting a global improve-
ment in risk comparison from the geometric label-
ing. As such, the benefits conveyed by the geometric
scale seem to far outweigh the minor dip in perfor-
mance on the basic knowledge questions, especially
if the latter was merely due to an initial lack of famil-
iarity.
Results regarding the integration of information
onto the matrix axes/into the text versus the use of
a legend were equivocal. There was a small inter-
action effect (f = 0.13) suggesting that integrated
information improved performance for both matrix
conditions, but worsened it for the text condition.
This may be due to an “information overload” effect
with the text condition: integrating the information
made the sentences much longer and denser than
with the legend, and the resulting “cognitive load”
(Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2004) may have made it
more difficult to identify key pieces of information. It
may also be that the loss of some information in the
integrated text condition contributed to the poorer
performance: Participants in this condition were not
shown the full range of possible values of likelihood
and impact scales, unlike participants in both the in-
tegrated and legend matrix conditions, due to the in-
herent difficulty of adapting conditions that were de-
signed for use with a matrix to text stimuli. In short,
the way in which information was integrated in the
integrated text condition was necessarily fundamen-
tally different from the way in which it was integrated
into the visual matrices, so it is perhaps unsurprising
to find an interaction with no main effect. Finally, as
in Experiment 1, we also saw an overall preference
to reduce impact over likelihood, which was not af-
fected by condition.
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this pair of experiments we set out to inves-
tigate the effects of risk matrix cell format and axis
labeling on a public audience’s comprehension and
judgment. We were particularly interested in how to
help people compare risks positioned relative to each
other on nonlinear axes.
The results from both experiments in the study
show that, across all measures, text alone generally
performed worse than at least one of the matrix con-
ditions, suggesting that there may be an advantage
in using some kinds of risk matrices to represent
risk likelihood and impact. The effect sizes were gen-
erally very small, however, perhaps because in this
study only one or two risks were illustrated per ma-
trix, meaning that the information presented was rel-
atively simple.
Nevertheless, out of the three matrix cell designs
we tested (square, rectangular and “logarithmic”),
Experiment 1 found that the “logarithmic” format
alone resulted in a small but significant benefit as
compared with text. In Experiment 2, we found a
main effect of format with the same descriptive pat-
tern of means (text < standard < logarithmic) on
the measure used in Experiment 1, and found ad-
vantages for the logarithmic and standard matrices
vs. text when using a more comprehensive “overall
performance” measure. A more robust finding was
that a geometric labeling (in this experiment, a ge-
ometric scale with labels of 1, 5, 25, 125, and 625)
created an improvement in scores of moderate effect
size (f = 0.41 for risk comparison, f = 0.33 for over-
all performance), suggesting that emphasizing a non-
linear scale with nonlinear labeling is more salient
than attempting to do so with the shape of the ma-
trix cells. We also found some evidence that, for ma-
trices, integrating quantitative information about the
likelihood and impact scales onto the axes may have
helped people take it into account more effectively
than when it was consigned to a separate key.
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When combined with relevant theory, some of
these experimental results offer hints about possi-
ble mechanisms behind some of the differences ob-
served, which may inform the design of a wider range
of risk communication visualizations than the specific
subset analyzed here. In addition to the possible ef-
fects of cognitive load, potential mechanisms include
effects on top-down knowledge and bottom-up pro-
cessing as well as familiarity effects.
4.1. The Possible Role of Top-Down Knowledge
and Bottom-up Processing
As discussed above, in Experiment 1, the use
of a “logarithmic” cell design improved comprehen-
sion of the nonlinear nature of matrix axes above
that of a text-based control. This result could be
attributable simply to bottom-up processing, where
the “logarithmic” cell design works with (rather
than against) cognitive heuristics such as magnitude
priming. In other words, although such heuristics can
be subject to bias and result in irrational decision
making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), when applied
in the right circumstances they can result in more
“rational” judgements and decisions than a more
deliberative, top-down process might (Gigerenzer &
Brighton, 2009). Alternatively, and concordant with
the presumed importance of top-down knowledge
for the results observed by Heckler et al. (2013), who
found that labeling log scales using tick marks with
varied spacing improved comprehension, such an
effect could be explained via an interaction between
bottom-up processing and top-down knowledge.
Specifically, the increasing size of cells toward the
top right of the “logarithmic” matrix may have
provided a bottom-up visual cue to users that in
turn reminded them of the nonlinear nature of
the underlying scale (top-down knowledge), thus
facilitating better comprehension of the nonlinear
nature of the matrix axes. Of course, both processes
could have been at work independently; there is
evidence for the importance of both domain-specific
and domain-general top-down knowledge in graph
comprehension (Pinker, 1990; Shah & Freedman,
2011).
4.2. Familiarity Effects
Across the two experiments, we also saw effects
that are likely due to familiarity or unfamiliarity with
formats. For example, the comparatively high perfor-
mance with the standard matrix among participants
who said that they were used to risk matrices (see
Appendices) is likely because matrix-familiar partic-
ipants already have training in that particular format
and are therefore comfortable using it; whereas, for
the logarithmic matrix and text condition, they have
to first learn a new graphic schema (Pinker, 1990).
Similarly, participants generally expressed a subjec-
tive preference for the format they had seen during
the experiment—the well-known “mere exposure”
effect (Zajonc, 1968)—and a relative aversion to “un-
usual” formats, such as the logarithmic matrix and
geometrically increasing scale labels. The latter are
likely unfamiliar within a broader context of graphi-
cal formats experienced in everyday life, where table
cells are generally evenly sized, and scales are gener-
ally arithmetically rather than geometrically increas-
ing.
Participants’ preference of familiar over un-
familiar formats may raise concerns for some risk
managers who would otherwise consider altering
their risk matrix format in light of our findings
on comprehension and performance. Several facts
should ease such qualms. First, while the preference
differences between conditions were significant, they
hardly suggest a burning hatred for novel formats.
Among all participants, 42% preferred the linear
scale labels, 35% preferred the geometric scale
labels, and 22% had no preference; similarly, 42%
preferred the standard matrix, 30% the logarith-
mic matrix, 13% the text, and 15% no preference
(Appendix E). Additionally, confidence intervals
around proportions of participants viewing each
format suggested that the geometric labels—the
change that had the greatest positive effect on risk
comparison scores—were as likely to be preferred as
the linear labels by those who were randomized to
use the geometric scale labels for the brief duration
of the experiment. This is presumably due to the
“mere exposure” effect, but also potentially because
participants noticed that they made the task easier
than it might have otherwise been. This is good news,
as it suggests that there is little downside to the use
of geometrically increasing scale labels, other than
the fact that new users may initially prefer linear
scale labels until they spend a few minutes building
up some familiarity with the new format. Note also
that preferences for graphical formats of risk com-
munications are not generally associated with how
well individuals understand the risks being commu-
nicated (Barnes, Hanoch, Miron-Shatz, & Ozanne,
2016; Hamstra et al., 2015; van Weert, Alblas, van
Dijk, & Jansen, 2021).
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Our recommendations in the Conclusion are
therefore more closely guided by our findings on
comprehension than they are by preferences and self-
reported ratings. One caveat is that matrix-familiar
participants may have a different pattern of perfor-
mance than matrix unfamiliar participants. This ef-
fect was not caused by differing numeracy scores be-
tween the two groups—for both experiments, there
was only a small difference between numeracy scores
for matrix-familiar and matrix-unfamiliar partici-
pants. It seems likely to be an effect of familiarity,
or perhaps even a statistical artefact given matrix-
familiar participants made up a small proportion of
the overall sample (359 out of 1,260). Further work
on this specific population is needed, and risk man-
agers considering making changes to risk matrices for
an audience with prior risk matrix experience may
wish to carry out familiarization and training before
introducing a new format of any kind.
4.3. Limitations
This study only examined semiqualitative ma-
trices. Though qualitative and quantitative matrices
may share some design concerns with semiqualitative
matrices, they have their own specific concerns that
cannot be covered here. There are also broader issues
regarding their methodology and, in the case of quan-
titative matrices, their underlying calculations that
perhaps outweigh any design concerns. See Monat &
Doremus (2018) for a further account of some math-
ematical issues with quantitative matrices.
Additionally, it is possible that we missed ef-
fects that we were theoretically powered to detect
due to the reduction in power resulting from the
use of alternative tests when ANOVA assumptions
were violated, for example, the partial proportional
odds model and the Mann–Whitney U test. This
risk was, however, mitigated by running confirmatory
ANOVAs (which are relatively robust to normality
violations) in instances where nonnormality resulted
in us choosing a nonparametric test for the primary
analysis (see relevant appendices for more details). It
is also possible that some effects were not detected by
some tests run on subgroups of the participant popu-
lation, for example, people who had prior experience
with risk matrices, as this subsampling similarly re-
sulted in a reduction in power.
Finally, this study tested a small space within the
broad range of risk matrix formats and options avail-
able. A search of matrices found in various academic
papers, in governmental and industry reports, and on-
line shows an enormous amount of variation in de-
sign. Other improvements are likely to be discovered
by further exploration of formats.
4.4. Ethical Use of Risk Matrices
Many organizations have an ethical imperative
to make decisions that reduce risks to life, health, and
property, and to ensure that these decisions are based
on sound judgment and accurate impressions of the
likelihood and consequence of these risks. We hope
that the recommendations and findings here will fa-
cilitate these aims. However, many important factors
are not represented in risk matrices, and there are
ethical problems with relying upon them in an overly
narrow fashion. For example, all decisions necessarily
have positive and negative externalities that are not
included in the measure of “impact” used by the risk
assessment, which must also be taken into account.
Some have also argued that the use of numbers in
difficult-to-quantify risk assessments is misleading.
For example, the specific numbers on our geometric
scale (1, 5, 25, 125, 625) could conceivably cause an
imprecise risk assessment to be interpreted as more
precise than it truly is. While it is our contention that
the “wiggle room” afforded by imprecise qualitative
language leads to far greater ethical risk—for ex-
ample, the notoriously variable interpretations that
intelligence analysts ascribe to phrases like “serious
possibility,” ranging from odds of 80/20 to 20/80 (Tet-
lock & Gardner, 2015)—the appropriate communi-
cation of uncertainty in risk estimates is extremely
important. It is crucial that risk matrices not be used
as a replacement for critical thinking, but rather as
one tool in a toolbox for ethical decision making.
4.5. Future Directions
Many risk matrices use color in their cells to
indicate severity of risk, acceptability/tolerance of
risk, or prioritization of remediation. Concerns have
been raised previously, notably in Monat and Dore-
mus (2018), that these can affect judgements in unin-
tended ways. Experimental work in this area would
be useful to examine for such effects. Other aspects
of risk matrices that require investigation include
how risks are presented on the matrix, how changes
to risks (e.g., difference between impact/likelihood of
a risk before and after mitigation) are presented, the
benefits and drawbacks of continuous versus categor-
ical representations, and how the uncertainty of risk
estimates is represented.
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Fig 8. A matrix showing the three fea-
tures recommended as a result of this
study: geometrically increasing labels
for each axis, representing the nonlin-
ear nature of the underlying scale; in-
creasing cell sizes to reinforce the non-
linear nature of the scale; and informa-
tion about likelihood and/or impact in-
tegrated directly into the matrix (rather
than in a separate legend) for ease of
reference
5. CONCLUSIONS
The current study suggests that there are changes
to the standard format of qualitative and semiqualita-
tive risk matrices (rectangular cells, linear scale label-
ing, use of a key) that may help them to communicate
risk more effectively. Based on evidence from Ex-
periment 2, the primary recommendation for an im-
proved risk presentation format is the use of ordinal,
explicitly nonlinear scale labels for matrices with an
exponential or otherwise nonlinear increase in like-
lihood and/or impact along the axes. These types of
scales represent the nonlinear change from one cell
to another by increasing in a suitable geometric pro-
gression (e.g., 1, 5, 25, 125, 625).
Evidence from Experiments 1 and 2 also suggests
a possible benefit of a “logarithmic” format with in-
creasing spacing between lines, although it should
be emphasized that this may not be true for peo-
ple who are already familiar with risk matrices, and
that significant differences between the logarithmic
and standard formats were not observed in either
study.
There was no statistically significant main effect
of integrating information about the meaning of each
column and row into the display versus placing it in
a separate legend. However, interactions suggested
that integrated information may have improved task
performance for the standard and logarithmic ma-
trices, but worsened task performance for the text
conditions. This finding is supported by prior re-
search regarding the benefits of integrating informa-
tion into diagrams wherever possible (Carpenter &
Shah, 1998). It may be worth considering integrating
any information currently in a key onto the matrix,
where this is graphically reasonable.
Some of these changes (logarithmic matrix;
integrated information) may not be subjectively
preferred by users on first experience despite their
benefits, but opinions are likely to improve swiftly
with familiarity. The change with most consistent
beneficial effect (geometric scale labeling) was not
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dispreferred by participants who had been random-
ized to use matrices with this labeling over the course
of the experiment. See Fig. 8 for an example of our
recommended matrix format.
More broadly, we would recommend the use of
cues that remind users of the true scale of the axes,
and which minimize cognitive load, even if these
changes are met with some initial resistance. If our
findings in Experiment 2 are any guide, users are
likely to feel much more comfortable and confident
with the new display after a short amount of practice
and regular use.
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